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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
By way of a caveat, Illinois attorneys should pay heed to this extension
of the word "interest." If it is the wish of the client that the attorney
drafting the instrument be named executor, or the executor's attorney,
and such a direction is included in the instrument, it should be witnessed
by others not so named. Where there are two competent witnesses in
addition to the attorney, and such a direction is made, the attorney should
not testify as a witness.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY NOT SPECIF-
ICALLY PROVIDED FOR COMPENSABLE UNDER
OTHER PROVISIONS OF ILLINOIS ACTS
Plaintiff was injured while in the course of his employment for defend-
ant when a safety device on the "man-lift" elevator he was riding failed to
operate. The resulting injuries included a ruptured urethral which ren-
dered him impotent. The defendant provided a compensation for medical
expenses and for the time of disability in accordance with provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act. Subsequently, plaintiff initiated an
action in common law negligence on the ground that his particular dam-
age did not fit a category of specific injuries and thus was not covered by
the Act. The Circuit Court of Peoria County dismissed the action on the
basis that it was barred by section 5 (a) of the Act.2 On direct appeal to
the Supreme Court of Illinois the judgment to dismiss was affirmed on the
grounds that the injury was compensable under a provision providing
compensation for the loss of testicles. Moushon v. National Garages, Inc.,
9 Ill. 2d. 407, 137 N.E. 2d 842 (1956).
The underlying theory of Workmen's Compensation legislation "is to
make the risk of the accident one of the industry itself ... and hence that
compensation on account thereof should be treated as an element in the
cost of production added to the cost of the article and borne by the com-
munity in general." The mechanics of this theory may be likened to a
contract where, in return for an extension of the employer's liability to
the coverage of injuries not compensable at common law, the employee
1 "Urethra, a membranous canal which carries off the urine from the bladder, and in
the male it also conveys the seminal fluid. The male urethra extends from the neck of
the bladder to the urinary meatus (the opening in the end of the penis)." Maloy, Sim-
plified Medical Dictionary for Lawyers, 438.
2111. Rev. Stat., (1955) c. 48, § 138.5 (a). "No common law or statutory right to re-
cover damages for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line
of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided shall be
available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this act ......
8 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Law 2 (2d ed., 1932).
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waives his right to bring an action where negligence would lie. 4 Thus,
where all parties are subject to the act, the right to bring a common law
action against the employer for injuries caused by his negligence is barred. 5
But should the Compensation Act be extended to cover injuries for
which no express provision has been made? Such legislation has generally
been given two interpretations: one of strict construction, whereby an
injured party's common-law remedy is not extinguished unless expressly
provided for by the Act; the other, a broad interpretation in which the in-
jured party's common-law remedy is extinguished, leaving the Compensa-
tion Act as his exclusive remedy.
Illinois has always held that, whenever possible, a broad construction
should be given the Act so as to effectuate the legislative intent., Thus,
where controversy has arisen concerning the applicability of the Act to
a particular injury, the courts have sought to place these injuries somehow
within the purview of the statute.
In Kivish v. Industrial Commission,7 an employee was sent to a hospital
for treatment of an accidental injury arising out of his employment. While
there he died of influenza which he contracted while under treatment.
The court allowed compensation for the death, ruling that the employer
was liable for the consequences of treatment to which the injured em-
ployee submits upon demand. In Lincoln Park Coal and Brick Co. v In-
dustrial Commission, the claimant received a severe X-ray bum resulting
from the treatment of a compensable injury. Although there was no pro-
vision for this type of injury within the Compensation Act, the court
nevertheless held it to be compensable on the grounds that it was closely
connected with the original injury. The court remarked:
Such an injury is not expressly provided for by the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act (but that Act should be, and is, liberally construed to carry out its
manifest purpose and intention, and a few of our decisions ... have some tend-
ency to support a construction which would authorize an award in this case.9
4 Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 111. 179, 106 N.E. 2d 124 (1952); Fulton v.
Knight, 346 Ill. App. 122, 104 N.E. 2d 554 (1952); Hill-Luthy Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 411 Ill. 201, 103 N.E. 2d 605 (1952); Petrazelli v. Propper, 409 Ill. 365, 99 N.E.
2d 140 (1951); Keeran v. Bloomington and Champaign Traction Co., 277 111. 413, 115
N.E. 636 (1917).
5 Briggs v. Farnsworth, 336 Il. App. 417, 84 N.E. 2d 330 (1949); O'Brien v. Chicago
City Ry. Co., 305 Ill. 244, 137 N.E. 214 (1922); Wilson Garment Mfg. Co. v. Edmonds,
312 Ill App. 317, 38 N.E. 2d 534 (1921).
6 Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 2 Ill. 2d 590, 119 N.E. 2d 224 (1954); People
ex. rel. Radium Dial Co. v. Ryan, 371 111. 597, 21 NE. 2d 749 (1939); Faber v. Industrial
Commission, 352 Ill. 115, 185 N.E. 255 (1933).
7312 l. 311, 143 N.E. 860 (1924).
8 317 M. 302, 148 N.E. 79 (1925). 9 Ibid., at 307 and 80.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
In Lambert v. Industrial Commission,'° the claimant, who wore glasses
to correct his faulty vision, suffered a permanent injury to his eyes while
in the course of his employment. The employer, in denying liability,
claimed that since the claimant's vision was defective prior to the accident,
he was no worse off because of the injury. The court ruled that although
the claimant's eyes were faulty prior to the accident, they were normal
with correction at that time, and the corrected, and not the uncorrected,
vision should be the determining factor in awarding compensation. In
Hayes v. Marshall Field and Co.,1 the plaintiff brought an action of neg-
ligence against her employer for the loss of an eye resulting from the
treatment by a company physician for an irritation in that area. The plain-
tiff's action was predicated on the theory that the injury was not caused
by a peculiar hazard of employment and thus was not compensable under
the Compensation Act. It was held that this particular injury arose out of
the course of employment and was covered by the Act, thus extinguishing
plaintiff's cause of action.
While there are factual differences in the cases cited and in the problem
presented, it is apparent that the Illinois courts have sought to place the
injured employee somewhere within the ambit of the Act wherever feas-
ible, holding that this is consonant with the legislative intent. In Matthies-
sen and Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission,12 the court observed:
It is, therefore, clear that the words "accident" and "accidental injury" used
in the Act were meant to include every injury suffered in the course of em-
ployment for which there was an existing right of action at the time the act
was passed .... 18
Following this line of reasoning, the court disposed of the instant case
by ruling that although plaintiff's specific injury was not covered by the
Act, the resulting damage of impotency was covered by Section 8 (e), pro-
viding for the loss of testicles.
This broad construction was vigorously attacked in the dissenting
opinion by Justice Bristow, who claimed that the majority decision was
based on nothing more than "medical fiction.' 1 4 He called on the court
to apply the strict construction followed in other jurisdictions. This doc-
trine is predicated upon two fundamental principles. First, while a statute
may extinguish a common-law right, such an intention "must be expressed
10411 Ill. 593,104 N.E. 2d 783 (1952).
11 351 Ill. App. 329, 115 N.E. 2d 99 (1953).
12 284 Ill. 378, 120 N.E. 249 (1918).
13 Ibid., at 382 and 251.
14 This reference was made in showing that no evidence has been introduced to prove
that the damaged urethra was the actual cause of plaintiff's impotence, and thus it was
argued that the injury was not within the provisions of the Act.
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in clear and unequivocal language."' 15 This reasoning was advanced in
Billo v. Allegheny Steel Co., 6 where the court ruled that the silicosis con-
tracted by the plaintiff was not within the Pennsylvania Compensation
Act in that the injury did arise from an "accident" as required by the
statute. The court observed:
It would be a perversion of the humane purpose of the Act to hold... an em-
ployee was by the Act deprived of a valuable legal right which had theretofore
been his. No court will give the Act such an interpretation unless required to
do so by the Act's explicit language. 17
Secondly, it is argued that too broad an interpretation would be tanta-
mount to judicial legislation.' 8
Courts are not permitted by construction to carry a statute, particularly one
in derogation of the common law, beyond its clearly defined scope. It is for the
legislature to limit or extend the operation of its enactments, and even though
there are no self-contained limitations, it would be judicial legislation to ex-
tend a statute beyond its subject matter.'0
Upon this theory many jurisdictions have denied statutory compensation
unless the specific injuries have been expressly provided for in the Acts.20
A prime example of this may be seen in Boyer v. Crescent Paper Box Co.21
There, the plaintiff sued in common law negligence for injury to her
scalp when she was literally scalped by a machine used in her employment.
This injury was not covered by the Compensation Act at the time of the
accident, although it was provided for in the revised statute at the time
the case was before the Supreme court. The plaintiff's common law ac-
tion was allowed on the grounds that the injury was not covered at the
time of the accident, and it was immaterial that it subsequently was pro-
vided for.
15 Triff v. National Bronze and Aluminum Foundry Co., 135 Ohio St. 191, 20 N.E. 2d
232 (1939); Boal v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 98 F. 2d 815 (C.A. 3rd, 1938); Coving-
ton v. Berkeley Granite Corp., 182 Ga. 235, 184 S.E. 871 (1936); Downing v. Oxweld
Acetylene Co., 112 N.J.L. 25, 169 Ad. 709 (1933); Jones v. Rinehart, 113 W. Va. 414,
168 S.E. 482 (1933); Szalkowski v. C. S. Osborne & Co., 9 N.J. Misc. 538, 154 Ad. 611
(1931).
16 328 Pa. 97, 195 Ad. 110 (1937).
17 Ibid., at 115.
18 Whitmore v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 105 Ohio St. 295, 136 N.W. 910
(1922); Western Indemnity Co. v. Milam, 230 S.W. 825 (Tex. Civ. App., 1921); Page
v. N.Y. Realty Co., 59 Mont. 305, 196 Pac. 871 (1921); Frey's Guardian v. Gamble
Bros., 188 Ky. 283, 221 S.W. 870 (1920).
19 Rosenfield v. Matthews, 201 Minn. 113, 275 N.W. 698, 699 (1937).
2 oManning v. Gosset Mills, 192 S.C. 262, 6 S.E. 2d 256 (1939); Dixon v. Gaso Pump
and Burner Mfg. Co., 183 Okla. 249, 80 P. 2d 678 (1938); Donnelly v. Minneapolis Mfg.
Co., 161 Minn. 240, 201 N.W. 305 (1924); Shinnick v. Clover Farms Co., 169 App. Div.
236, 154 N.Y.S. 423 (1915).
21 143 La. 368, 78 So. 596 (1917).
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While it can be seen that many jurisdictions are prone to construe the
Workmen's Compensation Acts strictly, the Illinois courts have generally
followed a practice of broad construction. However wide the difference
in these two views may be, there is one factor common to both-each doc-
trine is predicated upon legislative intent.
In concluding this discussion, one point in the instant case should be
noted. The court stated:
Yet, even if it be assumed that the injury is not under section 8(e), it does
not follow that the plaintiff should prevail. He still is covered by the Act and
sustained an actual injury for which he received compensation benefits. There-
fore, by its clear import section 5(a) bars his suit.22
Can this be taken to mean that so long as the parties are subject to the
Act, every injury, whether expressly mentioned or not, will be covered
by the statute? The courts may very well so rule, using reasoning similar
to that found in the dissenting opinion in Boyer v. Crescent Paper Box
Co.:
23
In adopting a [Compensation] Act, ... it is impossible to forsee every kind
of injury that may occur. The most that can be done is to make provisions ap-
plying indiscriminately to injuries in general, and to classify as far as possible
injuries in general.2 4
22 Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407, 410, 137 N.E. 2d 842, 844 (1956).
28 143 La. 368, 78 So. 596 (1917).
24 Ibid., at 600.
